Court Ruling in Bonaire climate case spotlights colonial legacy in climate adaptation debate

THE HAGUE--A recent legal analysis by Tycho Scholten argues that the Bonaire Climate Case is not only a landmark decision on climate protection, but also a reminder that today’s climate vulnerability in the Caribbean can be traced, in part, to the colonial past.

In the ruling delivered on January 28, 2026, the District Court of The Hague found that the Netherlands is taking too few measures to protect Bonaire against climate change impacts. The judgment is widely seen as significant because it addresses both mitigation (emissions reduction) and adaptation (preparing for and responding to climate impacts), placing climate policy squarely in the realm of rights and governance.

Scholten notes that during the hearing, Bonairean plaintiffs emphasized how colonial-era policies and exploitation still shape present-day vulnerability. The summons, as described in the analysis, pointed to examples ranging from inhumane slave labor on the salt flats to the lasting effects of logging and environmental extraction that weakened the island’s resilience over time.

One specific reference made it into the judgment: the court notes that the slave houses, described as the only tangible monuments from the slavery period, sit near the coast on the low-lying southern tip of Bonaire. With sea levels rising, that cultural heritage now faces direct physical risk.

While the court provides background on Bonaire’s position as part of the Netherlands Antilles from 1954 to 2010, and as a public entity of the Netherlands from 2010 onward, Scholten stresses that the deeper historical context matters.

The analysis points to 1636, when the Netherlands conquered Bonaire from Spanish colonists who had been present since 1499, after which Bonaire remained a Dutch colony for roughly three centuries. In Scholten’s framing, this history is not separate from climate policy, it is embedded in how vulnerability was produced and how responsibility is understood today.

Three ways the colonial past links to climate vulnerability

Scholten situates the case within a growing body of climate justice scholarship that connects ecological harm to colonial history. He notes that this link was recognized by Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in 2022 and is increasingly explored by scholars such as Farhana Sultana and Daphina Misiedjan.

He highlights three recurring areas that help interpret the Bonaire Climate Case:

1. Extraction and deforestation as drivers of vulnerability
European colonization in regions like the Caribbean involved deforestation, extraction of natural resources, and large-scale exploitation of people and ecosystems. Scholten argues that European powers benefited materially from this extraction, while their long-term greenhouse gas emissions contributed to harms that now affect former colonies earlier and more severely.

2. Social justice cannot be separated from environmental policy
Drawing on Malcolm Ferdinand’s book Decolonial Ecology, Scholten references the concept of “colonial habitation,” an exploitative interaction between wealthy Europeans, other people, non-human nature, and the earth. The analysis emphasizes that because natural exploitation is intertwined with human exploitation, climate action also requires social justice, including who bears the costs of “green solutions” and who benefits.

Scholten further points to a persistent blind spot in parts of Western European environmental governance: ecological problems and solutions are too often treated as separate from their socio-economic consequences for disadvantaged communities. He references Nani Jansen Reventlow’s book Radical Justice, which argues that affected communities should be placed in leading roles in climate action.

3. Separate legal orders, then and now
Scholten also notes the legacy of separate legal treatment. He references legal historian Peter van den Berg, who has written about how colonial-era law differed from law in the Netherlands, particularly in the rights afforded to colonial subjects. Scholten argues that echoes of this separation appear today in elements discussed in the judgment, including climate treaties that do not apply to the Caribbean Netherlands, the differentiation provision in Article 132a(4) of the Dutch Constitution, and the court’s discussion of the lack of adaptation policy for the Caribbean Netherlands.

Climate justice as an organizing principle

Scholten frames the ruling as a step toward climate justice, even though the court itself does not use that phrase. For comparison, he points to the Pakistani Leghari climate case, where the Lahore High Court defined climate justice as linking human rights and development to safeguard vulnerable groups while fairly sharing the burdens and benefits of climate change.

Building on that definition and his own earlier writing, Scholten identifies four climate justice elements that he says are reflected in the Bonaire ruling:

1. Human rights, with attention to lived realities
Scholten argues that the ruling treats climate protection as a human rights matter and indirectly considers socio-economic conditions on Bonaire. He notes that Greenpeace sought to ground the case in Bonairean experiences and broader concerns. He also notes that, in its defense, the Dutch State presented basic services such as affordable drinking water and poverty reduction as parts of adaptation policy.

2. Fair distribution and responsibility
Scholten describes fairness as central to the ruling: the State is instructed to do more to limit harm to a vulnerable population that has contributed little to emissions. He also highlights that the court was critical of the State’s limited consideration of historical emissions, describing this as a negative factor tied to the “grandfathering” approach. In adaptation, he notes the court’s position that the State unjustifiably made less effort for the Caribbean Netherlands than for the European Netherlands over a long period.

3. Recognition and unequal treatment
Scholten emphasizes the significance of the court finding not only a violation of the right to private and family life, but also unequal treatment. He notes that while structural subordination is not new for Bonaireans, the legal recognition matters: the judgment was issued in three languages, with translations into English and Papiamentu.
In his analysis, the court’s approach narrows the distance between previously separate legal orders by emphasizing equal application of human rights and by indirectly assessing climate standards even where they do not formally apply in the Caribbean Netherlands.

4. Participation and procedural safeguards
Finally, Scholten highlights the court’s focus on public involvement, arguing that full participation is itself part of climate justice. He points to the creation of a Bonaire Climate Table, described as a mechanism to involve local parties in shaping climate policy, even if it came later than it should have.

About the author

Tycho Scholten, LL.M., is a lecturer-researcher in Constitutional and Administrative Law at Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam.

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